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SMOKE GETS IN YOUR EYES:
IS SECONDHAND SMOKE IN THE WORKPLACE A TORT?
by
Robert S. Wiener*

INTRODUCTION
Employees across the nation work many hours a week indoors where they are exposed to
environmental hazards •• among these is secondhand smoke. Recent EPA research
reports that long·tenn exposure to the smoke of others can cause serious disease. 1 Even
in the short term, some Susceptible people exhibit a wide range of physical reactions. 2
What are the rights of nonsmokers who want to work in a smoke-free environment? What
are the rights of smokers who want to smoke while they work? What are the
responsibilities of employers who employ both smokers and nonsmokers?
Many local governments have passed legislation to restrict smoking in workplaces. These
laws may sanction employers who do not enforce the rules. But this paper concentrates
on civil tort suits filed by individuals3 against businesses or other individuals for smoking
in a workplace.

What tort theories are available to these plaintiffs? What difficulties will they encounter in
pursuing their cases? What defenses are available to defendants? What remedies may
result from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff? Does the law make sense? What are the
public policy considerations involved? Should a smoker have to stop smoking? Should a
nonsmoker have to leave? Does the actual or potential injury to the nonsmoker matter?
Is it enough if tobacco smoke is. noxious to a nonsmoker? Is the test objective or
subjective? What ramifications do these answers have for control of other atmospheric
chemicals?
Agency issues arise when a company is sued for the actions of its employees. Under the
principle of respondeat superior, a principal is legally responsible for the intentional
actions of its agents authorized within the scope of employmem. Is smoking on the job
such an action? Is the employer liable for the recreational smoking of its employees?

I.

THE CASES

This paper focuses on four reported cases brought by nonsmokers based on secondhand
smoke in the workplace.
1.
The first case concerns events that transpired at a WL W radio show in Cincinnati,
Ohio. It was the day of the Great American Srnokeout, a national promotion to
encourage smokers to quit smoking. Abron Leichtman, who claimed to be "a nationally
known''4 opponent of smoking, was invited to discuss the ill effects of primary and
secondary smoke on Bill Cunningham's radio talk show. During the show, Cllllillngham
incited Furman, host of another WLW radio talk show, to repeatedly blow cigar smoke in
Leichtman's face. Funnan complied. Leichtman sued WL W Jacor Communications, Inc.,
William Cunningham, and Andy Furman.5 On 23 January 1994, the Ohio Court of
Appeals denied Leichtman's claims based on a tortious invasion of his privacf and
negligence/ but remanded the case for determination on the issue ofbattery.s

2.
Pamela S.
worked as an office manager for Dynapro, Inc. in Oak Brook,
Illinois. As a result ·Of her passive inhalation of cigarette smoke, Pechan required
"injections, medication and an inhaler because of coughing, wheezing, difficulty breathlng
and sleeping, swelling sinuses, dripping sinuses, swelled filce and eyes, hives, throat
irritation and dryness, light-headedness, dizziness, watery eyes, burning nose, headaches
and stress manifested by a spastic colon. "9 According to the complaint, although Dynapro
had a stated nonsmoking policy and was given documented notification of Pechan's
problems, it did not enforce its policy through either prohibition or restriction of smoking.
Pecan claims that she was forced to resign. The Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed in its
19 October 1993 opinion the trial court's summary dismissal of Pecan's claims of battery
and negligence. ' 0
3.
Bonnie Richardson worked for several years as a receptionist for First Federal
Savings & Loan Association of Valdosta, Inc. 11 J.R. Hennly, Jr., an administrative officer,
smoked a pipe. Although Richardson worked in the lobby, about 30 feet from Hermly's
office, she medically documented allergic reactions to his pipe smoke that caused "nausea,
stomach pain, loss of appetite, loss of weight, headaches, and anxiety. "12 Despite the
company's purchase and use of air cleaners, Richardson continued to have adverse
reactions resulting in two hospitalizations. In the end, Richardson was discharged,
allegedly primarily for excessive absenteeism. The Georgia Court of Appeals decided on
1S July 1993 in favor of Richardson's right to a trial as her claims of battery and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.

* Associate Professor of Legal Studies, Lubin School of Business, Pace University
Westchester

4.
A fourth case well worth considering, if only to see how the law on secondhand
smoke may have changed since 1979, is William T. McCracken v. O.B. Sloan.U
McCracken, a Charlotte, North Carolina postal employee, complained of smoke in the
post office building. He asked for sick leave due to his allergic reaction to cigarette smoke.
At two meetings with postmaster O.B. Sloan to discuss his request, Sloan smoked a cigar.
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McCracken sued Sloan. 14 McCracken lost because the court rejected what it saw as his
assertion of a right to a "glass cage."
II.

TORTS

In these cases, the plaintiff sued on the basis of a variety of common law tort theories.
A. INTENTIONAL

All plaintiffs argued that the defendants had committed intentional tons.
1.
Battery
In each case, the nonsmoker ctarrned that the smoker had connnitted a battery with
secondhand smoke. A battery is an intentional tort. 15 As with all torts, a plaintiff who
proves that the defendant has acted in a tortious manner proximately causing actionable
injury to the plaintiff is entitled to a remedy. This is because. as Roscoe Pound wrote "In
civilized society men must be able to assume that others will.do them no intentional
---that others will commit no intentioned aggressions upon them" 16

a.
6£!: The act required to prove a battery is sometimes described as an
"intentional, offensive touching." 17 Offensive contact may be described as that which is
"offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity." 13 The Ohio Supreme Court has
defined "offensive" to mean "disagreeable or nauseating or painful because of outrage to
taste and sensibilities or affronting insultingness." 19 The act requirement is not satisfied if
the touching is C<lnsented to or authorized. The concept of implied consent to secondhand
smoke is discussed below under the "Glass Cage" Defense. Contact satisfying the battery
test includes far more than the contact of a fist. A bat or bullet will also do. But can one
commit a battery with tobacco smoke? A battery includes "the precipitation20 upon the
body of a person of any material substance."21 And courts have decided that tobacco
smoke is "particulate maner."22 "Pipe smoke is visible; it is detectable through the senses
and may be ingested or inhaled. It is capable of "touching" or making contact with one's
person in a number of ways.'123 So the answer is generally yes. 24 However, the Illinois
court in Pechan did seem to question the intentional act aspect of smoking. "[T]he act of
smoking generally is not done with the intent oftouching others with emitted smoke."25
In the Leichtman case, Andy Funnan conunitted a battery by intentionally blowing cigar
smoke in Leichtman's face. 26 The Richardson court decided that if Hermly, "knowing it
would cause her [Richardson] to suffer an injurious reaction, intentionally and deh'berately
directed his pipe smoke at her in order to injure her or with conscious disregard of the
knowledge that it would do so," that would constitute a battery.27
Can one be liable for a battery if the actual smoke blowing was conunitted by another
person? As with other batteries, encouraging another to commit a battery is a tortious
21
act. Therefore, in the Leichtman case' William Cunningham
· 's urgm
' 0a that Andv Furman
.
blow cigar smoke in Abron Leichtman's face was, in itself, a battery when Funnan
J
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repeatedly did so. 29 And Richardson's suit against First Federal was sent to trial even
though Federal's employee, Hennly, smoked only in an enclosed office and First Federal
had installed arr cleaners.30
Pechan also sued her employer for battery because "smoke did contact and enter into and
upon" 31 her body without her C<lnsent. Furthermore, Dynapro pennitted its employees to
"intentionally emit cigarette smoke into the office atmosphere" even though it knew of
Pechan's sensitivities. Dynapro argued that smoking is a lawful act and does not rise to the
level of a battery.32 Although the Illinois C<lurt agreed that the plaintiffs battery theory
might prevail/3 it decided against her based on the facts ofthe case.
b.
Proximate Cause: In battery cases, as with all other torts, the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant's act was a proximate cause of its injury, that is, the act was an
actual cause of the injury and the injury was reasonably foreseeable. It has been argued
that with a "smoker battery," if exhaled smoke is substantially certain to contact a
nonsmoker, the smokex: is liable.34 However, this argument was rejected by the Leichtman
C<lurt. 35 And it was
alleged by Pechan "that reasonable persons should have known
that their smoke would have contacted Pechan in sufficient quantity to reasonably cause
the damages
An interesting question is whether the reasonable foreseeability
ofbann from seC<lndhand smoke increases as infonnation on the danger of tobacco smoke
grows and is widely disseminated.

not

.lD,jyn: As long as a tortious battery by the defendant proximately causes
c.
injury to the
the plaintiff is entitled to a remedy. Even if the injury is trivial, the
plaintiff will prevail; however, reC<lvery may be limited to nominal damages of a single
dollar. 37
In the Leichtman case, the court decided that having smoke blown in one's face was
injurious, even if trivial.38 In the Richardson and Pechan cases, the plaintiffs had
heightened sensitivities to tobacco smoke and, therefore, significant medical injuries.
There was also a sensitive plaintiff in the McCracken case, but the C<lurt could "find no
evidence that the plaintiff suffered any physical illness from inhaling the cigar smoke. "39
Injury to orclinary people from mere passive smoke inhalation is not addressed in these
cases. Is an increased risk of lung cancer or even the fear of cancer from exposure to
secondhand smoke an actionable injury?
2.

Infliction of Emotional Distress

Even in the absence of physical illness, nonsmokers may bring the intentional tort cause of
action of infliction of emotional distress. According to modem common law, if extreme or
outrageous intentional conduct by the defendant causes emotional harm, the plaintiff need
not show physical injury. 40
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This issue of law was presented to the trial court mthe Richardson case. Was Hennly's
conduct sufficiently extreme or outrageous as to result in liability for physical injury?
the
Elements to be considered include the defendant's control over the
defendant's awareness of the plaintiffs susceptibility, and the severity of hann suffered by
the plaintiff. The Richardson appellate court decided that all of these elements existed.
The sole question that remained, the intentionality ofHennly's actions, was for the jury to
decide. 4 1
Although McCracken filed no complaint based on infliction of emotional distress, the
court in his case observed "That person did experience some mental distress as a result of
inhaling the cigar
Based on my reading of the opinion, this court would not
have seen the postmaster's smoking as either extreme or outrageous conduct, although it
was, beyond a doubt, intentional.
3.

Invasion of Privacy

1.
Common Law Negligence
Under common law negligence, the plaintiff would have to prove that a common law duty
ofdue care .existed for the defendant to keep the plaintiffs air smoke free and that the duty
was breached.
·

Pechan argued that Dynapro had created a duty of care through its own smoking policy
and that it breached that duty through its failure to enforce the policy. 5°
2.
Negligence Per Se
Under a theory of negligence per se, the plaintiffs claim is that a statute established the
defendant's duty to the plaintiff. For example, a nonsmoker might argue that a health
regulation created a duty to provide a smoke·free environment. In the Leichtman case, a
Cincinnati Board of Health Regulation51 made it illegal to smoke in certain public places)
but the court determined that the sanctions provided by the statute did not create a
common law cause of action for negligence per se.52

Does intentionally blowing tobacco smoke into someone's face constitute the tort of
invasion of privacy? The intentional tort of invasion of privacy comprises four separate
torts. 43 The only possibly appropriate one here is intrusion on a party's solitude, seclusion,
habitation, or affairs that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.44

Pechan argued that D}11apro was statutorily negligent due to its violation of the lllinois
Clean Indoor Air Act, but the court decided her case on other grounds. 53

This claim was raised by Leichtman, but rejected by the court because be "willingly
entered the WLW radio studio to make a public radio appearance with Cunningham who
is known for his blowtorch rhetoric. "45 Although the resuh was probably correct in this
case, consider whether privacy rights extend outside one's own home and their relevance
to secondhand smoke cases.46

Employers may be strictly liable for the tortious acts of their employees under the theory
of respondeat superior. However, even if the tort is intentional, the employer will not be
liable unless the act is committed within the employee's scope of employment. This is a
question of fact usually answered at trial A number of earlier cases decided that
employers were liable for harm done as a result of the smoking of their employees.s-4

4.

Assault would be another possible tort claim for violation of one's "interest in freedom
from apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact with the person." 47 However, none of
the three most recent cases contains a cause of action based on assault.
In William T. McCracken v. O.B. Sloan,•s Sloan said at least once, "BiU, I know you claim
to have an allergy to tobacco smoke and you have presented statements from your doctor
stating this, but there is no law against smoking, so I'm going to smoke. "49 This seems to
meet the criteria for an assault) but, because there was no evidence of physical harm, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals decided that there was no actionable assault.
B. NEGLIGENCE
Injured nonsmokers may also argue the tort of negligence, that is, a breach of a duty of
due care.

C.

STRICT LIABILITY

The appellate court in Leichtman left it to the trial court to decide if WL W Radio's owner
was liable for the tortious acts of its employees. Is blowing cigar smoke into a guest's fuce
within the scope of a radio host's employment? Here the court answered yes. 55
III.

DEFENSES

Aside from the argument that the plaintiff has not proved its case by a preponderance of
the evidence, derendants in secondhand smoke cases have offered the following defenses.
A

WORKERS' CO.MPENSATION

Workers' Compensation Acts typically provide that recovery under the Act is an
employee's sole remedy for compensable injuries.56 Therefore, if an employee is entitled to
recover under a Workers' Compensation Act, the employer is protected from a private tort
action.
This is may well be a significant reason why employees such as McCracken do not file
The Pechan court decided that her claims based on
suits against their employers.
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negligence were compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act and, therefOre, she
was barred from recovery from her employer.58
However, Workers' Compensation does not protect employees who smoke from suits by
fellow employees. In the Richardson case, the court rejected the argument by J.R Hennly,
Jr., a fellow employee, that Workers' Compensation defended him against a nonsmoker

preliminary and pennanent injunctive relief against smoking may be sought; however, if
the plaintiff is no longer employed by the defendant, that particular issue is moot.66 The
same may be true of reinstatement because the plaintiff may not wish to return to an
unwelcome environment.67
V.

NON-TP.RLO.MMS

suit. 59

B. ASSUMPTION OF RISK
The defendant may argue assumption of risk, that is, that the plaintiff knowingly and
voluntary asswned the risk of secondhand smoke. For example, a nonsmoker who is
aware ofthe risk of contact with tobacco smoke, but never complains about exposure has
assumed that risk. However, in the cases studied, the plaintiffs did complain. Even
though Leichtman may have "willingly entered the WLW radio studio," he did not
willingly submit himself to tobacco smoke.60 Moreover, defendants who become aware
only now ofthe risks associated with secondhand smoke, may not be said to have assumed
that risk in the past.
C.

THE "GLASS CAGE" DEFENSE

Public policy ramifications of secondhand smoke cases were raised in the 1979
McCracken v. Sloan case.61 There, the North Carolina Court of Appeals advanced a
concept of implied consent to secondhand smoke. [I]n a crowded world, a certain amount
of personal contact is inevitable and must be accepted. Consent is assumed to all those
ordinary contacts which are customary and reasonably necessary to the common
intercourse of life. Smelling smoke from a cigar being smoked by a person in his own
office would ordinarily be considered such an innocuous and generally permitted
contact.... [l]t may be questioned whether any individual can be pennitted, by his own
fiat, to erect a glass cage around himself, and to announce that all physical comact with his
person is at the expense ofliability.62
The date of the McCracken case should be noted. Fifteen years ago, the data supporting
the harmfulness of secondhand smoke were not well-developed. In fact, that court
observed, "We express no opinion as to what the result would be if there were evidence of
some physical injury... "63 But even if there is an allergic reaction, do we want our society
to protect us from all injury caused by others, even by their perfume of choice?
The Leichtman court did not apply the "glass cage" defense to Andy Funnan. because the
deliberate blowing of smoke into someone's face is not passive smoke.64 The McCracken
case was cited with approval by the Pechan court.65
IV.

Note that certaln. nonsmokers may have legal·recourse based on statutory protection.
A.

WORKER'S COMPENSATION

Nonsmoking employees who are harmed by secondhand smoke may file workers'
compensation claims. However, these may be rejected if the employer has a defense valid
under the applicable Workers' Compensation Act. 68

B.

HANDICAPPED CODES

Legislation to protect the handicapped may protect those with special sensitivity to
tobacco smoke. The Georgia Equal Employment for the Handicapped Code (GEEHC)69
protects the handicapped from discrimination in the workplace. "Handicapped individual"
means "any person who has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one
or more of such person's major life activities, and who has a record of such impairment. "70
Because ruchardson's sensitivity to tobacco smoke resulted in problems on the job and,
ultimately, in the loss of her job with First Federal, the appellate court could not decide, as
a matter of law, that she was not a "handicapped individuaL "7 1

VI.

PUBLIC POLICY

The judges in several cases expressed significant reservations about the appropriateness of
dealing with secondhand smoke cases in the courts.
The three appellate judges in the Leichtman case wrote in a per curiam decision, Arguably,
trivial cases are responsible for an avalanche of lawsuits in the courts. They delay cases
that are important to individuals and corporations and that involve important social issues.
The result is justice denied to litigants and their counsel who must wait for their day in
court.... This case emphasizes the need for some fonn of alternative dispute resolution
operating totally outside the court system as a means to provide an attentive ear to the
parties and a resolution of disputes in a nominal case. Some need a forum in which they
can express corrosive contempt for another without dragging their antagonist through the
expense inherent in a lawsuit.72

REMEDIES

In addition to legal remedies such as compensatory and pwlitive damages, equitable
remedies may be appropriate in secondhand smoke cases. If smoke is harming a plaintiff;
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It is hard to disagree with the plea for alternative means of dispute resolution, but the
more interesting questions is that of the role oflaw in society discussed in the McCracken
case. Surely, unpleasant contacts are an unavoidable part of life to aD but hermits in our
crowded world. Is secondhand smoke, at least for most, simply a trivial additional cost of
living to be added to many others? Or should we deal with this matter differently because
this risk is avoidable, if only people would stop smoking, at least around nonsmokers?

8

Id at *11.

Pechan v. Dynapro, 622 N.E.2d 108, 1993 Ill. App. LEXIS 1598, *2, 1980 Ill. Dec. 698, 8 BNA IER
CAS 1793 (1993).

9

10

Jd at *42.

11

Richardson v. Hennly, 209 Ga. App. 868, 434 S.E.2d 772, 1993 Ga. App. LEXIS 1028, 63 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) P42,628 (1993).

CONCLUSION
One might think, with the emergence of anti-smoldng legislation, that courts will no longer
see suits by nonsmokers based on smoking in the workplace. A reduction of smoke would
reduce smoke-caused injuries. However, unless smoking bans are enforced, people will
continue to smoke at work. The habit is a hard one to break, even ifthe smoker wants to.
Nonsmokers often do not complain of smoke and are even less likely to bring a Lawsuit.
Some may not mind the smoke, but even if they do, they consider the career risks from
complaining about it, especially if the smoker is their superior. And the extremely limited
protection given to whistle blowers in most states gives little legal incentive to act. On the
other hand, if evidence grows about the harm of secondhand smoke, nonsmokers may
become more assertive in their quest for cleaner air. And with increasing legislation and
suits such as the ones discussed in this article, they may take their cases to court.
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